

tasy. The war is one of those immense problems, inescapable in real life, which yield to the daring and imagination of the comic hero<sup>39</sup>).

London (Royal Holloway)

Christopher Carey

---

39) This article was delivered as a paper at a meeting of the Classics Research Seminars at St Andrews in May 1986.

## THE CONCLUSION OF AESCHINES' *ALCIBIADES*

A good deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the fragments of the dialogue *Alcibiades* of Aeschines Socraticus, with the result that its general character, and certain features of Aeschines' methods of composition, have emerged quite clearly<sup>1</sup>). A brief reconsideration of fr. 11a-c (D[ittmar]) and their ordering may yet advance our understanding of the final portion of this interesting and important remnant of *Socratica*.

α) “Ἐγὼ δ' εἰ μὲν τινι τέχνῃ ᾧμην δύνασθαι ὠφελῆσαι πάνυ ἂν πολλὴν ἑμαυτοῦ μωρίαν κατεγίνωσκον· νῦν δὲ θεῖα μοῖρα ᾧμην μοι τοῦτο δεδῶσθαι ἐπ' Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ οὐδέν γε τούτων ἄξιον θαυμάσαι.”

---

1) See especially H. Krauss, *Aeschinis Socratici reliquiae* (Lipsiae 1911); H. Dittmar, *Aischines von Sphettos* (Berlin 1912) 97-159 (hereafter 'Dittmar'); B. P. Grenfell-A. S. Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, 13 (London 1919) 88-94; A. E. Taylor, *Philosophical Studies* (London 1934) 1-27; R. A. Applegate, *The Alcibiades of Aeschines of Sphettus* (Diss. Princeton 1949); E. G. Berry, *TAPA* 81 (1950) 1-8; K. Gaiser, *Protrepik und Paränese bei Platon* (Stuttgart 1959) 71-95; B. Effe, *Hermes* 99 (1971) 198-208; C. W. Müller, *Die Kurzdialoge der Appendix Platonica* (München 1975) 150-5, 232-4; K. Döring, *Hermes* 112 (1984) 17-22. For a brief résumé of the *Alcibiades* see G. C. Field, *Plato and his Contemporaries* (London<sup>3</sup> 1967) 147-50.

b) “Πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν καμνόντων ὑγιεῖς γίνονται οἱ μὲν ἀνθρωπίνη τέχνη, οἱ δὲ θεία μοῖρα. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἀνθρωπίνη τέχνη, ὑπὸ ἰατρῶν θεραπευόμενοι, ὅσοι δὲ θεία μοῖρα ἐπιθυμία αὐτοὺς ἀγεῖ ἐπὶ τὸ ὀνήσον· καὶ τότε ἐπεθύμησαν ἐμέσαι, ὅπότε αὐτοῖς ἔμελλε συνοίσειν, καὶ τότε κυνηγετῆσαι, ὅπότε συνοίσειν ἔμελλε πονῆσαι.”

c) “Ἐγὼ δὲ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα ὃν ἐτύγχανον ἔρων Ἀλκιβιάδου οὐδὲν διάφορον τῶν Βακχῶν ἐπεπόνθειν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ Βάκχαι ἐπειδὴν ἔνθεοι γένωνται, ὅθεν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκ τῶν φρεάτων οὐδὲ ὕδωρ δύνανται ὑδρεύεσθαι, ἐκείναι μέλι καὶ γάλα ἀρύονται. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ οὐδὲν μάθημα ἐπιστάμενος ὃ διδάξας ἀνθρωπον ὠφελήσαμι· ἄν, ὅμως ὄμην ξυνὼν ἄν ἐκείνῳ διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν βελτίῳ ποιῆσαι.”

The fragments (Socrates is the speaker) are presented above as they appear in Dittmar's edition. Krauss however had accepted only 11a and c (his frs. 3–4) as true remains<sup>2</sup>). That 11c is indeed a genuine extract from Aeschines' dialogue, and belongs in its present position, is certain, since we have the testimony of Aelius Aristides, our source for all the above passages (Or. II 61–2, 74 L[enz]-B[ehr]), that the *Alcibiades* concluded with these sentences<sup>3</sup>). The way in which 11a is introduced by Aristides puts its Aeschinean authorship also beyond any serious doubt<sup>4</sup>). That 11b, though rejected by Krauss, represents the actual words of Socrates in the dialogue, is hardly less secure: Aristides' use of parenthetical *φησὶν* (sc. Aeschines) to introduce the passage<sup>5</sup>), and his effusive praise which follows hard upon it ('*Ἡράκλειος, ὡς διαρροήδην καὶ περιφανῶς Αἰσχίνης ὁ τοῦ Πλάτωνος συμφοιτητῆς μαρτυρεῖ Πλάτωνι ταῦτ(α) κτλ.*), all but clinch the case for the inclusion of these sentences in any collection of Aeschines' fragments.

All discussions and translations since Dittmar treat his arrangement of 11a–c as canonical; in the most recent it is stated that 11a 'seems to lead on' to 11b<sup>6</sup>). It must be noted, however, that

2) In this he was following C. F. Hermann, *De Aeschinis Socratici Reliquiis* (Göttingen 1850) 23.

3) II 74 L–B ἐνταῦθα τελευτᾶ τῶν διαλόγων οὐ διὰ αἰνιγμάτων, οὐδὲ ὑπονοίας, οὐδὲ τρόπον τινὰ ταῦτα λέγων ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἔξεπίτηδες εἰς τὴν χρεῖαν πεποιηκώς.

4) II 61 L–B οὐ γὰρ που δυσχερανεῖ Πλάτων, ἐὰν Αἰσχίνης ἐπιμηφίση Πλάτωνος εἰπόντος “Ἐγὼ δ' εἰ κτλ.”

5) On the use of *φησὶν* in citing the evidence of ancient witnesses, see C. Osborne, *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics* (London 1987) 17–19.

6) T. J. Saunders (ed.), *Plato. Early Socratic Dialogues* (Harmondsworth 1987) 378. For a more recent adherence to the traditional order of fragments see now G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*, II (Naples 1990) 609–10 (Giannantoni's fr. 12).

Aristides himself provides no explicit sanction for this sequence: he cites 11a shortly before 11b, but makes not the slightest reference to the priority of one over the other, nor does he draw any inferences which might imply that 11b, in its original context, must proceed logically from 11a. On the other hand, if we consider Aristides' motive for citing Aeschines, and his method of argumentation, it becomes evident that, irrespective of what the true sequence in the *Alcibiades* might be, the order 11a–b is especially advantageous to him. For Aristides in Or. II ('Υπὲρ ὀητορικῆς) is seeking to defend rhetoric against Plato's attacks in certain dialogues (especially *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*), in particular Plato's criticism that rhetoric is not a τέχνη, but rather a 'knack' (ἐμπειρία, τριβή). He therefore looks to the higher authority of Socrates, as one whose utterances Plato would not venture to refute<sup>7</sup>), and, in support of the efficacy of θεία μοῖρα as a respectable and legitimate counterpart to τέχνη, cites Socrates' words (through Aeschines) concerning his personal experiences with Alcibiades (11a). Having invoked Socrates as a star witness, Aristides then generalizes, again through Aeschines (11b), about the activities – rhetoric is to be understood as one of them, cf. II 65 L–B – which may derive equal benefit from the influence of either τέχνη or θεία μοῖρα. It is clearly Aristides' intention that Plato should be non-plussed by this argument; but 11b gains its force primarily through the credibility which Socrates' own experience (11a) first guarantees it (note also Aristides' defence of the historical veracity of Aeschines' words, II 76–7 L–B).

There is, then, no a priori reason to place special confidence in the traditional order of fragments. On the contrary, I strongly suspect that this arrangement is Aristides', not Aeschines', and that 11b should precede 11a. With this sequence, Socrates' narrative proceeds by way of analogy. First (11b), circumstances within human experience (illness and recovery) are presented, in which the influence of either ἀνθρωπίνη τέχνη on the one hand or θεία μοῖρα on the other may be the critical factor. Then (11a), Socrates applies the same opposition to his relationship with Alcibiades by affirming his belief that he could have helped Alcibiades θεία μοῖρα, not τέχνη.

7) Cf. II 62 L–B (directly after fr. 11a) ἀκούεις (sc. Plato) ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σοι σοφώτατον νομίζοντος, προσθήσω δ' ὅτι καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τοὺς λόγους ἀνατιθέντος, ὅπερ καὶ σὺ τούτους. Moreover, Aeschines and Plato are said (II 62 L–B) to be 'from the same school' (ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου, quoting Grg. 493d5–6); cf. συμφοιτητής in II 63 L–B.

While the order 11a–b might suggest, superficially, an inductive process of the kind attested for the historical Socrates<sup>8</sup>), for several reasons it is unlikely to be right. First, we have some evidence that Aeschines elsewhere in his *œuvre* proceeded along the loosely deductive lines I have sketched above<sup>9</sup>). Secondly, the arrangement 11b–a would provide a much more natural lead into 11c, where, as we have seen, Socrates' mention of his relationship with Alcibiades caps off the dialogue (more on this below). Thirdly, the ἔρωξ hinted at in 11a (through reference to Socrates' relationship with Alcibiades)<sup>10</sup>) and explicitly mentioned in 11c (i. e. τὸν ἔρωτα, ἔρων, τὸ ἔρων) will then be seen to be subsumed under the generic term ἐπιθυμία of 11b; for a similar classification cf. Plat. Phdr. 237d3–4.

The most important consideration, however, is Alcibiades' role in this dialogue; for he (along with his association with Socrates) is clearly the predominant focus of interest in the *Alcibiades*<sup>11</sup>). It would therefore be curious and disappointing if he were treated merely as a means by which a wider perspective on the (admittedly important) concepts of θεία μοῖρα and τέχνη could be achieved. In fact, the evidence of our fragments, limited though it is, supports the inference that Socrates introduces the theme of θεία μοῖρα in order to account somehow for the effects of his συνουσία and ἔρωξ on Alcibiades in particular. Aeschines' motive here must have been at least partly apologetic: any negative influence which Socrates may be perceived to have exerted upon Alcibiades was outside of Socrates' own control (cf. Plat. Ap.

8) See in general W. K. C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy*, III (Cambridge 1969) 425–37.

9) Compare the similar application of craft-analogy in Aeschines' *Miltiades*, as discussed by S. R. Slings, *ZPE* 16 (1975) 304–5. A form of induction is however clearly discernible in his *Aspasia*, fr. 31 D.

10) As Gaiser observed (op. cit. [n. 1] 97–100), the activity of θεία μοῖρα, as the concept pertains to Socrates in fr. 11a, is manifested by Socrates' ἔρωξ; see also Müller, op.cit. (n. 1) 233; H.-D. Voigtländer, *RhM* 132 (1989) 42 n. 70.

11) This is evidenced by both the title of the dialogue and the surviving fragments (see below), but may also be surmised indirectly from other works in the Alcibiades-dialogue 'genre', cf. [Plat.] Alc. I and II; the Alcibiades 'type' Euthydemus in Xen. Mem. 4.2.1–40 (see Dittmar 121–30, 132–44); and (with caution) Antisthenes' *Alcibiades* (fr. 29a–33 Caizzi; see Dittmar 77 ff.; H. D. Rankin, *Antisthenes Sokraticos* [Amsterdam 1986] 126–7). Alcibiades' speech in Plat. Smp. 215a4–222b7 similarly concentrates upon the relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates.

33a5–b8; Xen. Mem. 1. 2.24–8)<sup>12</sup>). The central importance of Alcibiades' character within this dialogue may be further observed by the distinctiveness with which it is elsewhere drawn – I am thinking in particular of his tearful reaction in fr. 9 D to Socrates' proof of his inadequacy: ἀναγκάζει κλάειν θέντα τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπὶ τὰ γόνατα ἀθυμήσαντα, ὡς οὐδ' ἔγγυς ὄντα τῷ Θεμιστοκλεῖ τὴν παρασκευὴν (cf. fr. 10).

A final observation may help to place this discussion in a wider context. K. Döring has argued persuasively that the theme of 'improvement' ('Besser-Werden', 'Besser-Machen') runs through Aeschines' Socratic works like a *leitmotiv*<sup>13</sup>). This, I think, is especially apparent in the *Alcibiades*, where the dialogue actually ends with the words βελτίω ποιῆσαι<sup>14</sup>). If we accept the new arrangement which I have proposed for fr. 11a–c of this dialogue, this theme now emerges still more clearly and logically: whereas fr. 11b speaks of improvement (τὸ ὄνησον) merely at the level of the analoguous activities, references to improvement in fr. 11a (ὠφελῆσαι<sup>15</sup>), picked up by τοῦτο in the second sentence) and 11c (ὠφελήσαιμι ἄν, βελτίω ποιῆσαι) are directed solely at Alcibiades<sup>16</sup>). To retain the order

12) See also Dittmar 157–8. In light of certain comments which Socrates had made earlier in the *Alcibiades* (fr. 8 D) it is tempting to see another apologetic purpose behind Socrates' ascription of θεῖα μοῖρα to himself in fr. 11a–c: καὶ μηδὲν γ' ἐμοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καταγνῶς, ὡς πρὸς τὰς τύχας καὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα ἀλλοκότως καὶ ἀθέως ἔχοντος, εἰ προσίθημι ἐκείνῳ ἐπιστήμην πάντων, ὣν ἔπραττε, καὶ μηδεμίαν οἶομαι τύχην αἰτίαν τούτων τῶν ἔργων γεγενῆσθαι. πολὺ γὰρ ἂν ἐγώ σοι μᾶλλον ἔχοιμι ἀποδείξαι, τοὺς τάναντία ἐμοὶ δοξάζοντας ἀθέως ἔχοντας ἢ ἰκένοι ἐμέ, οἵτινες ἐξ ἴσου οἴονται τοῖς τε πονηροῖς καὶ τοῖς χρηστοῖς τὰς τύχας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς καλοῖς κάγαθοῖς εὐσεβεστέροις γε οὖσιν ἀμείνω τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ὑπάρχειν. So far was Socrates from being ἄθεος that he was actually the beneficiary of divine favour! If it is correct to make this retrospective connection, this would not be the only occasion in Socratic literature on which Socrates is numbered (here by implication) among of καλοὶ κάγαθοί; cf. [Plat.] Thg. 127a8–9; Xen. Mem. 1.2.17, Smp. 9.1. For Socrates as the paradigmatic καλὸς κάγαθός in a later tradition see K. Döring, Sokrates bei Epiktet, in: *Studia Platonica. Festschrift für Hermann Gundert* (Amsterdam 1974) 195–226.

13) Op.cit. (n. 1); see also Müller, op.cit. (n. 1) 232–3.

14) For the concluding of a dialogue with a thematic phrase, see S. R. Slings, *A Commentary on the Platonic Clitophon* (Amsterdam 1981) 387.

15) For ὠφελεῖν in this sense, cf. Plat. Ap. 24e10, 25c1; also S. R. Slings, *Mnem.* 4.29 (1976) 47.

16) In fr. 11c Socrates drags in αἱ Βάχχαι expressly for the purpose of a simile (οὐδὲν διάφορον τῶν Βαχχῶν ἐπεπόνθειν), in order to clarify his peculiar kind of experience vis à vis Alcibiades. Unlike fr. 11b within its traditional place, the simile focuses, rather than diverts, our attention.

11a–b–c must surely distract from Aeschines' point in utilizing the theme in the first place<sup>17</sup>).

St. Johns, Newfoundland

Mark A. Joyal

---

17) Both Plato and Xenophon also explore the use of this theme. Socrates in Plat. Ap. 24d3 ff. ironically presents the paradox that while all Athenians improve the young men of the city, he alone corrupts them.  $\omega\phi\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$  = 'to improve' figures prominently in Xen. Mem., especially books III and IV, where early references to Socrates'  $\omega\phi\epsilon\lambda\iota\alpha$  (cf. III 1, IV 1) serve a programmatic function (see also O. Gigon, Kommentar zum ersten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien [Basel 1953] 94 f.). Moreover, Xenophon's defence of Socrates against the official charge of corrupting the young is contained in Mem. I 2.1–8 and shows why the theme of 'improvement' is a cornerstone around which he constructs his work: rather than corrupt, Socrates turned young men toward virtue and 'care of the soul'. I submit that Aeschines' use of this theme basically serves the same apologetic function that is so evident in Plato and Xenophon. For other apologetic devices in the *Alcibiades*, cf. my remarks in the preceding paragraph, with n. 12; and for further points of contact between the *Alcibiades* and the Platonic *Apology*, see Döring, op.cit. (n. 1) 27–9.

For support of my research I wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

## THE *CORNICULA* ASCRIBED TO PLAUTUS

The now fragmentary comedy *Cornicula* was attributed to Plautus by the two late grammarians Nonius and Diomedes; Varro knew the play and although he quoted from it twice he did not name the author. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate what can be learned about this lost comedy by comparing its seven brief but informative fragments with similar elements in surviving plays<sup>1</sup>).

---

1) The utility of this method has been demonstrated by J. Wright, *Dancing in Chains: The Stylistic Unity of the Comoedia Palliata* (Rome 1974); however, Wright did not include in this essential work a study of the "lost" comedies of Plautus. Works on individual fragmentary plays attributed to Plautus include F. Winter, *Plauti Fabularum Deperditarum Fragmenta* (Bonn 1885); H. T. Rowell, *Accius and the Faeneratrix of Plautus*, *AJP* 73 (1952) 268–280; H. Lucas, *Zum Fretum des Plautus*, *RhM* 87 (1938) 188–190; A. S. Gratwick, *Sundials, Parasites, and Girls from Boeotia*, *CQ* 29 (1979) 308–323; K. Déry, *Vidularia: Outlines of a*